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TRADE SECRETS AND PERSONAL SECRETS
Lital Helman *
Two separate systems of law govern secrets. The first one concerns
trade secrets: confidential business information that provides an
enterprise with a competitive edge. The unauthorized use of a trade
secret by persons other than the holder is regarded as an unfair
practice and a violation of the trade secret. The second system protects personal secrets. This system is information privacy law. Information privacy law deals with the regulation, storing, and use of
personal information of individuals. While both systems concern secrets, the laws that govern them comprise entirely different regimes,
and have almost nothing in common.
This Article aims to examine the different ways in which the law
protects commercial and private secrets. The most fundamental difference is that the trade secrets regime forbids the unauthorized use
of a business’s confidential information, while privacy law does not
forbid the unauthorized use of a person’s confidential information.
If a firm takes measures to protect information of value, the law
forbids the use of this information. Yet, as to personal secrets, the
mere fact that someone has taken measures to protect their privacy
does not create an obligation to avoid misappropriation of their information.
This asymmetry of protection is especially troubling when these
two systems collide. For example, certain information can be subject
to a trade secret of a company, while at the same time strongly ‘belong’ to an individual. Trade secret laws often prevent individuals
from learning about uses that firms conduct with their own private
information.
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author is also thankful for input received in the 2020 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference and in the Ono Faculty Workshop.
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This Article explores the extent to which the distinction between
the two laws is justified, and analyzes whether the law of information privacy can be modified to resemble trade secrecy more
closely. This exploration is particularly relevant under today’s climate of commodification of private information, where both users
and companies make transactional use of personal data on a regular basis.
INTRODUCTION
Two separate systems of law govern secrets.1 The first one concerns trade secrets: confidential business information that provides an enterprise with a competitive edge.2 The unauthorized use
of a trade secret is regarded as an unfair practice and a violation
of trade secret law.3 The second system protects personal secrets.
This system is information privacy law.4 Information privacy law
deals with the regulation, storing, and use of personal information
of individuals.5 While both systems concern secrets, the laws that
govern them comprise entirely different regimes, and have almost
nothing in common.6
The fundamental difference between the regimes is that trade
secret law forbids the unauthorized use of a business’s confidential
information, while privacy law does not forbid the unauthorized
use of a person’s confidential information.7 If a firm takes
measures to protect information of value, the law forbids the use
of this information.8 Yet, as to personal secrets, the mere fact that
someone has taken measures to protect their privacy does not create an obligation to avoid misappropriation of their information.9

1. There are, of course, other laws that concern confidentiality in particular contexts,
such as contract law, criminal law, etc. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and
Freedom of Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1817, 1818 (1993) (discussing the criminal offense
of blackmail).
2. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985); see also infra section II.A.1.
3. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2); see also infra section II.A.1.
4. See infra section I.B.
5. See infra section I.B.
6. See infra section I.B.
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra section I.A.
9. See infra section I.B.
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This Article explores the extent to which the distinction between
the two regimes is justified and analyzes whether privacy law can
be modified to resemble that of trade secrecy more closely. My main
thesis is that adoption of relevant trade secrecy doctrines can encourage both responsible sharing and responsible use of information in the context of information privacy law. Despite obvious
differences, trade secret law forms an equivalent regime to information privacy law, with a solid set of caselaw, robust policy justifications, and relevant experience in how to protect secrets under
the law. While the analogy between trade secrecy and information
privacy laws has its limits, it is nonetheless a useful framework
with which to rethink information privacy.
The first contribution of this Article to the literature is the uncovering of the doctrinal differences between trade secrecy and information privacy law. I show that trade secret law offers more robust protection in five critical areas. First, trade secret protection
attaches to any valuable information that the owner of which
treats as secret. In contrast, privacy law denotes a categorical, objective view of sensitive information, regardless of individual attitudes or preferences of the information subjects.10 Second, trade
secret protection is triggered when firms take reasonable efforts to
maintain secrecy.11 Yet, precautions that individuals take when
sharing information have no legal effect in the privacy arena.12
Third, while trade secrecy protects against downstream, conscious
use of misappropriated secrets, privacy protection does not extend
against third parties.13 Fourth, privacy remedies pale in comparison to the remedies available for trade secret owners.14 Finally,
trade secret law is well enforced in court, while privacy law is increasingly the domain of administrative enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission.15
The result of these differences is a robust trade secret law alongside a weak and equivocal privacy protection. This asymmetry of
protection is especially troubling when these two systems collide.16
An example of collisions includes cases where certain information
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra section I.C.1.
See infra section I.C.1.
See infra section I.C.2.
See infra section I.C.3.
See infra section I.C.4.
See infra section I.C.5.
See infra section II.A.2.
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can be subject to a trade secret of a company, while at the same
time strongly ‘belong’ to an individual. Trade secret law can, in
such cases, limit individuals from accessing, correcting, or challenging uses of such information.17
The second contribution of this Article to the literature is in
providing an analysis of the normative foundations that trade secret law and information privacy law have in common. This Article
argues that these shared foundations—while not aiming to comprise the entire underpinnings of privacy protection—justify doctrinal borrowing from trade secret law. Indeed, it is broadly understood that the basic objective of trade secrecy is to encourage
mindful information sharing in the market.18 At its core, trade secret law, like other intellectual property law, answers Arrow’s disclosure paradox—that without legal protection, information would
not be shared.19 To facilitate mindful information sharing while
discouraging careless sharing, trade secret protection attaches to
valuable information if the secret holder used safeguards while
sharing the information.20 In striking contrast, extant privacy law
treats information disclosure like a fault. The governing standard
for privacy protection is “expectations of privacy,” and this standard typically leads courts to deny protection of information that
was originally shared voluntarily.21 Treating personal disclosure
like a fault makes very little sense in an economy that is fueled by
sharing personal information.22 Privacy law should instead aim to
encourage individuals to share information in a responsible manner, as trade secrecy does.
Trade secret law also aims to obviate investments by secret owners in wasteful self-help measures that firms can take to prevent
the disclosure of their secrets.23 But the law unjustly recognizes no
such concern in the privacy context. Thus, the law grants no legal
effect to safeguards that individuals may take to protect the information that they share. The result is that nothing in current law

17. See infra section II.A.2.
18. See infra section II.A.1.a.
19. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
20. See infra section II.A.1.a.
21. See infra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Sebastian Sevignani, The Commodification of Privacy on the Internet, 40
SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 733, 733–36 (2013).
23. See infra section II.A.1.b.
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incentivizes users to use safeguards responsively. Individuals react to this reality in one of two ways. They either use no safeguards
at all when sharing information or engage in information-obscuring methods that are not only wasteful but may also have negative
externalities, such as interfering with law enforcement, slowing internet use, or generating other risks.24
Finally, in today’s marketplace, where transactional use of private data is commonplace, even trade secret law’s objective to further business ethics applies to information privacy. Indeed, the
same concern that companies have—that misappropriators of their
secrets will gain an unfair advantage over them based on their own
information—is now shared by individuals. One of the most prevalent privacy complaints today is that privacy violators have used
personal information to enhance their bargaining power against
the information’s subject, by engaging in price discrimination or by
exploiting the individuals’ vulnerabilities in various other ways.25
This normative analysis is important even though it does not—
and does not aim to—capture the full theoretical and normative
depth of privacy protection. This analysis is important because uncertainty around the underpinnings of privacy has prevented
courts and other policy makers from effectively addressing contemporary privacy harms. Such uncertainty has also focused much of
the privacy scholarship on theorizing, defining, contextualizing,
categorizing, and justifying the right to privacy rather than developing its doctrines and remedying intrusions.26 Indeed, exposing
the underlying rationales of privacy law is an ongoing—and important—endeavor, and I myself have contributed to it.27 Yet the
stakes for privacy have increased exponentially in the information
age, and workable conceptual frameworks that can address privacy
24. See infra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. 653, 657 n.21 (2019)
(“One of the more common type of privacy article is the categorization article, that is, an
article that seeks to impose order on privacy by defining and describing subcategories o[f]
the phenomenon, usually drawing on nonlegal social science methods and perspectives in
the process.”); Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457,
1462 (2012) (“[T]he causes of action available for virtual injuries probably do a better job of
describing than remedying.”).
27. See generally Lital Helman, Pay for (Privacy) Performance: Holding Social Network
Executives Accountable for Breaches in Data Privacy Protection, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 523
(2019) (discussing the current data protection privacy laws in the United States and demonstrating an ongoing need for a legal framework that can accommodate the expansion of
modern technology and social networking).
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concerns are required in the academic literature alongside this endeavor.28
Let us now take the above analysis one step forward and demonstrate how doctrinal adoption from trade secret law can have positive normative payoffs in the privacy realm. One doctrine that privacy law can effectively borrow from trade secret law is the
reasonable precautions standard. This standard means that firms
can effectuate trade secrecy protection by taking reasonable
measures to protect their valuable information.29 Embracing this
doctrine in the privacy context (with necessary adjustments) would
allow users to show that they took reasonable precautions to safeguard their information even in cases where they shared the information voluntarily. Proving “reasonable precautions” would work
to establish “expectations of privacy,” and thus trigger privacy protection.30 Such a standard in information privacy law could yield
dramatic improvements over the current regime. First, it would
enhance privacy protection and create certainty in the market and
in courts. Second, it would generate incentives for users and businesses to share information and to use personal information of others in a responsible manner. Finally, this standard would boost innovation, because jurisdiction around reasonableness would
incentivize the industry to offer productive self-measures for privacy and curtail the creation of bad precautions that are so common today.
While this Article is not the first to ponder the connection between information privacy law and intellectual property regimes,31
it is the first to offer a normative and doctrinal analysis of information privacy and trade secret law in light of each other. It is also
the first to propose a new conceptual framework for privacy law
28. See Scholz, supra note 26, at 657 n.21 (“The problem with many categorization articles is that they do not make clear how precisely these categorizations will help lead to
better-protected privacy rights, beyond the general observation that it will provide policymakers with more information and ‘clarity.’”).
29. See infra text accompanying note 99.
30. See infra section I.C.2.
31. Two articles to date touched on this connection. See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as
Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1151–58 (2000) (analyzing whether privacy
should be perceived as intellectual property); Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What
Privacy Advocates Can Learn from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 667, 669–70
(comparing the development of trade secrets and privacy law); see also Gianclaudio Malgieri,
Trade Secrets v Personal Data: A Possible Solution for Balancing Rights, 6 INT’L DATA
PRIVACY L. 102, 102 (2016) (discussing a particular conflict related to database protection
under European law).
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that can help the law overcome some of its most pressing contemporary problems.
This Article unfolds as follows. The first Part describes the law
of trade secrecy and the law of privacy, and highlights the doctrinal
similarities and differences between them. The second Part analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of the differences between the
trade secrecy and privacy regimes, and inquires to what extent
they are justified. Based on this analysis, I consider harmonization
of some of the doctrines of trade secrecy and privacy law. A short
conclusion ensues.
I. THE LAWS OF TRADE SECRECY AND OF PRIVACY
This Part examines the main doctrines of trade secret law and
privacy law in the United States.32 As I show below, trade secrecy
is a robust intellectual property right that is well-defined and wellenforced by the courts. In contrast, privacy law is an incoherent
landscape, riddled with specific regulations and enforced mainly
by the administrative branch.
A. Overview of Trade Secret Law
Trade secret protection concerns valuable information that is
not generally known to the public, when the owner of such information undertakes reasonable precautions to preserve secrecy.33
Trade secret protection originated in state common law and unfaircompetition principles.34 But what started among individual
states’ common law has since become a powerful intellectual property right across the nation.35 Almost all states adopted a version
32. For a historical assessment of the development of both trade secret law and privacy
law, from common law to their expression in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see generally
Sandeen, supra note 31.
33. For early statements of these conditions, see, e.g., Nat’l Tube Co. v. E. Tube Co., 3
Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 459, 462 (1902), aff’d, 70 N.E. 1127 (Ohio 1903); Pressed Steel Car Co. v.
Standard Steel Car Co., 60 A. 4, 9–10 (Pa. 1904); Eastman Co. v. Reichenbach, 20 N.Y.S.
110, 111, 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892), aff’d sub nom. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Reighenbach, 29
N.Y.S. 1143 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1894).
34. See James Pooley, The Myth of the Trade Secret Troll: Why the Defend Trade Secrets
Act Improves the Protection of Commercial Information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1048
(2016). For a detailed history of the evolution of trade secret law, see Sharon K. Sandeen,
The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 498, 500–01 (2010).
35. See Joseph P. Fishman & Deepa Varadarajan, Similar Secrets, 167 U. PA. L. REV.
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of the 1979 United Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”),36 and in 2016, Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), introducing
federal trade secret protection that largely mirrors the UTSA.37 In
the words of Peter Menell, trade secrets have become “the most
pervasive form of intellectual property in the modern economy.”38
The scope of trade secrets is defined expansively.39 Trade secrets
can apply to information of any sort, such as technology, operations, strategy, financials, staff, and customers.40 To qualify for
protection as a trade secret, the information must meet three criteria. First, it must have “independent economic value, actual or
potential.”41 Second, it must not be “generally known” or “readily
ascertainable.”42 Third, the owner must take reasonable efforts to
maintain its secrecy.43 A trade secret has no fixed term—protection
lasts as long as the secret is kept as such.44
Once a trade secret is established, its owner can enforce the
trade secret against misappropriators. Misappropriation of trade
1051, 1055 (2019) (“Trade secrecy was once a decentralized product of individual states’ common law. It’s now a major IP scheme.”).
36. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (outlining the principles of
trade secret law). States have not always passed the UTSA verbatim. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3426. New York, North Carolina, and Massachusetts have not adopted the UTSA.
North Carolina has a similar statute, whereas New York and Massachusetts protect trade
secrets under common law. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade
Secret Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 n.7, 16 n.76 (2017); see also Pooley, supra note 34,
at 1051 (discussing the implementation of the UTSA in courts).
37. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376; see also
Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 35, at 1055 (noting that trade secrecy is considered “a
major IP scheme”).
38. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 36, at 3; see also JOHN E. JANKOWSKI, NAT’L SCI.
FOUND., BUSINESS USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION DOCUMENTED IN NSF
SURVEY 4 (2012), https://wayback.archive-it.org/5902/20150628145722/http://www.nsf.gov/
statistics/infbrief/nsf12307/nsf12307.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL52-5NMJ] (reporting survey
results that show that firms find trade secrets more important to their business than other
IP).
39. See, e.g., PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2019, at 36 (2019).
40. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1939); see also
Pamela Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First
Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 780 (2007).
41. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
42. See id.
43. See id. § 1(4)(ii).
44. See Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 35, at 1063 (noting that trade secrecy does
not expire if the secret remains undisclosed); see also David S. Levine & Christopher B.
Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study of the First Year of Litigation Under the
Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 146 (2018).
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secrets can occur either by acquisition of the information via “improper means,”45 or by disclosing or using it in violation of a confidentiality duty.46 Most cases of misappropriation fall into the second category; namely, they involve defendants who acquired the
secret legitimately, but are using or disclosing it in breach of a confidentiality duty, such as through former employees or business
associates.47 Each of these acts—acquisition, disclosure, and use of
a trade secret—forms an independent basis for trade secret liability.48
Trade secret law enforces the entitlement through both property
and liability rules.49 Thus, when a trade secret case is successful,
an injunction is the most likely remedy.50 Courts can enjoin either

45. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (“[I]mproper means
includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to
maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means.”); see also Telex Corp. v.
Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 897–98 (10th Cir. 1975) (interpreting the prerequisite); Univ. Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1974).
46. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (defining breach of confidence as violations of express or implied duties of confidence); see also
Union Carbide Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 77 F.3d 677, 678–79 (2d Cir. 1996); Tracer Research
Corp. v. Nat’l Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1293 (9th Cir. 1994); Comprehensive Techs.
Int’l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 732 (4th Cir. 1993); Smith v. Snap-On Tools
Corp., 833 F.2d 578, 579 (5th Cir. 1987); Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 F.2d
1195, 1197–98 (5th Cir. 1986); SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1251 (3d
Cir. 1985); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 573 F.2d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1978); Data Gen.
Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 834 F. Supp. 477, 481 (D. Mass. 1992).
47. See Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 35, at 1063–64 (quoting statistics that
show that “[t]he vast majority of trade secret cases . . . involve departing employees accused
of breaching express confidentiality duties,” and that in the first year of the DTSA, “twothirds of all cases . . . involv[ed] a current or former employee, a quarter involving a current
or former business partner, and only a tenth involving parties without any prior relationship.”).
48. See, e.g., GlobeSpan, Inc. v. O’Neill, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1235 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
49. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 36, at 46–47 (“[T]rade secret law allocates the entitlement to the trade secret information to the company and enforces that entitlement through
both property and liability rules.”).
50. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985); Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 35, at 1112 (encouraging the trend of some courts to limit the injunction’s duration to the estimated length of time it would have taken the competitor to develop
the secret independently); see also Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Axis Techs., LLC, 444
S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tex. App. 2014) (“[T]he ‘usual equitable order’ in a trade secret misappropriation case is a perpetual injunction against the wrongdoer.”). See generally E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 691, 706 (E.D. Va. 2012); Microstrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 661 F. Supp. 2d 548, 553 (E.D. Va. 2009) (granting injunction);
Flotec, Inc. v. S. Research, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 992 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (enjoining former employee from disclosure of trade secrets to new employer); Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. v.
Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1020 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1977) (enjoining former employee).
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actual or threatened misappropriation, and require misappropriators (or potential misappropriators) to refrain from using or disclosing the secret.51 An injunction is often granted alongside compensation, including actual damages and unjust enrichment.52
Courts may also award exemplary damages of up to double the
compensatory amount and attorneys’ fees in cases of willful and
malicious misappropriation.53
B. Overview of Privacy Law
Unlike trade secrecy’s robust protection in state and federal law,
privacy law is weak and fragmented. It is a patchwork of constitutional protections, federal and state statutes, tort law, regulatory
rules, treaties, self-regulation, and administrative regulation.54
Some of these norms apply broadly, but most of them apply only in
certain economic sectors or industries.55

51. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
52. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Unpacking Trade Secret Damages, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 155,
162, 195–96 (2017) (citing empirical scholarship demonstrating that “a trade secret owner
who prevails on damages is likely to also receive a permanent injunction”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
53. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2, 3(b), 4(iii) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
54. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1211 (2004) (“Suspicion of the state has always stood at the foundation of American privacy thinking, and American scholarly writing and court doctrine
continue to take it for granted that the state is the prime enemy of our privacy.”); Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1430 (2001) (“Privacy law consists of a mosaic of various types of law:
tort law, constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, evidentiary privileges, property
law, and contract law.”); Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact
of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 61–62 (2000) (comparing the “European scheme of empowering national supervisory authorities” to the alleged “decentralized U.S. approach”); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1632 (1999) (criticizing the patchwork
of privacy law).
55. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
877, 877, 887–88 (2003) (arguing that “privacy is protected only through an amalgam of
narrowly targeted rules. . . . leav[ing] many significant gaps and fewer clear remedies”);
Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014) (“There is a law for video records and a different law for
cable records. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) protects
the privacy of health data, but a different regime governs the privacy of financial data. In
fact, there are several laws that regulate financial data depending upon the industry, and
health data is not even uniformly protected: Not all health data is covered by HIPAA, and
various constitutional and state laws can protect health data more stringently than HIPAA.
Although state data security breach notification laws apply broadly across different industries, most state privacy laws are sectoral as well.” (citations omitted)); Christian Nisttáhuz,
Comment, Fifty States of Gray: A Comparative Analysis of “Revenge-Porn” Legislation
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Famously, in 1960, Prosser identified four torts that confer information privacy: intrusion upon seclusion, publication of private
facts, false-light publicity, and misappropriation of name or likeness.56 The four torts offer a basis for liability for privacy harms in
suitable cases, together with other torts that concern wrongful
business practices, such as fraud, theft, tortious interference with
contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.57 In the context of information privacy, however, the relevance of these torts has eroded
with time, as they struggle to apply to contemporary challenges of
information privacy.58
Alongside tort law, contract law can, at least in theory, protect
privacy law in circumstances of broken promises for confidentiality.59 Contract theories of liability could in principle apply to agreements between users and online platforms—in particular, privacy
policies.60 However, in practice, contract theories are rarely attempted, and courts have been reluctant to interpret privacy policies as binding contracts.61 Promissory estoppel—the equitable
Throughout the United States and Texas’s Relationship Privacy Act, 50 TEX. TECH L. REV.
333, 357–60 (2018) (surveying states’ legislation on revenge pornography).
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (addressing intrusion upon seclusion tort); id. § 652C (addressing appropriation tort); id. § 652D (addressing public disclosure of private facts tort); id. § 652E (addressing false light tort); see also
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 2, 6, 8 (2008); Sandeen, supra note 31, at 687–
92. See generally WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 107 (1st ed.
1941).
57. See Scholz, supra note 26, at 670 (arguing that “contract law and related interests
may be the primary source of consumer privacy rights is the status quo”). See generally
GABRIEL ABEND, THE MORAL BACKGROUND: AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY OF BUSINESS
ETHICS (2014); NATHAN B. OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW (2016).
58. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 587 (explaining why the four torts did not
apply to many new challenges).
59. See KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE
COMMON LAW 222–26 (1988); Scholz, supra note 26, at 669 (asserting that even implied
warranties or fiduciary duties may suffice to establish liability, given the infeasibility of
negotiated agreements).
60. See Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your Own Business: Privacy Policies in Principle
and in Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 91–92 (1999) (explaining ways in which website
privacy policies resemble contracts); see also Scholz, supra note 26, at 669 (stating that firms
routinely represent more privacy than they deliver).
61. See, e.g., Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. 094567 (RBK/KMW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43360, at *28–30 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010) (“Some
courts have held that general statements like ‘privacy policies’ do not suffice to form a contract because they are not sufficiently definite.”); In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig.,
379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (not finding JetBlue’s privacy policy to form
contractual obligation); Dyer v. Nw. Airlines Corps., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (D.N.D.
2004) (“[B]road statements of company policy do not generally give rise to contract claims.”);
In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-126 (PAM/JSM), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10580, at
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doctrine that protects those who detrimentally rely upon promises—could also form a basis for privacy liability.62 But courts have
declined to enforce it in the privacy context, mainly due to a lack
of detrimental reliance.63 As a result, despite the theoretical applicability of contract law and the support of some scholars of this
cause of action,64 cases involving contract theories are marginal.65
As Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog stated, “Today, contract
law—formal contract and promissory estoppel—plays hardly any
role in the protection of information privacy, at least vis-à-vis websites with privacy policies.”66
Throughout the years, federal and state laws have added specific
privacy protections that apply to certain industries, economic sectors, or particular conduct.67 California has taken a leading role in
this trend, with some spillover effects on other states.68 Yet, as dig-

*15–17 (D. Minn. June 6, 2004) (rejecting claim that Northwest Airlines’ privacy statement
constitutes unilateral contract); Daniels v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 22575/09, 2011
WL 4443599, at *7–8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 2011) (dismissing contract claim against
bank’s disclosure of secret materials during subpoena). But see Claridge v. RockYou, Inc.,
785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 864–65 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (declining to dismiss a contractual claim based
on privacy policy); Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Contracting over Privacy:
Introduction, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. S1, S7, S10 (2016) (showing that courts sometimes view
privacy policies as binding).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also
Scholz, supra note 26, at 670 (“Even where representation by a company is not binding in
contract, a showing of reliance on a promise provides grounds for an individual to seek relief
in promissory estoppel.”).
63. See, e.g., Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. 094567 (RBK/KMW), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26757, at *32 n.10 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2011)
(“[T]here is no evidence . . . that Plaintiff relied on a promise . . . . Therefore, no reasonable
jury could conclude that a contract existed between the parties based upon a doctrine of
promissory estoppel.”).
64. See Scholz, supra note 26, at 668–70.
65. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 596. Courts sometimes dismiss contractbased privacy cases based on lack of finding of harm. See infra note 134.
66. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 596–97.
67. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552a); Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107347, 116 Stat. 2946 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541–3549). Other areas where
privacy standards are predefined include, for example, limitations on the collection of personal data by government agencies, and limits on the interception of electronic data transmissions in the context of employment. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.);
see also supra note 55.
68. California law focuses mainly on limitations on data trading (rather than data collection). Parts of the Californian law have become the de facto national standard, for example the California Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579
(imposing requirements on privacy policies regarding California resident consumers).
Driven by the continued rise in consumer data breaches, California passed the California
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ital technologies reduced the costs of collecting and analyzing individual-level data, vulnerability to privacy violation expanded
faster than these laws.69 Some of the most troubling practices of
increasingly dominant industries—such as data collection and analytics by data brokers, merchants, social networks, and other digital services—fall outside of the regulated scope.70
Self-regulation largely fills the void.71 Individual firms, and in
some contexts, industry groups, largely design their own privacy
policies.72 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) oversees this
self-regulation regime, relying upon its broad powers under Section 5 of the FTC Act “to prevent . . . unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce.”73 Gradually, as privacy concerns that are
Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) in 2018. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1798.100. “While the CCPA is likely to undergo substantial changes, it clearly
sets to strengthen privacy protection in California, with likely spillover” to other states. See
Helman, supra note 27, at 529 n.29.
69. See James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 58 (2003) (discussing “holes in this patchwork of sector-specific privacy laws”);
Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Privacy and Innovation, 12 INNOVATION POL’Y &
ECONOMY 65 (2012) (arguing that contemporary practices are often unregulated).
70. Goldfarb & Tucker, supra note 69.
71. See Dennys Marcelo Antonialli, Note, Watch Your Virtual Steps: An Empirical
Study of the Use of Online Tracking Technologies in Different Regulatory Regimes, 8 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 323, 333 (2012) (“In the United States, the debate revolves around improving
the self-regulatory regime, rather than adopting a more normative framework.”); Kenneth
A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 247, 251 (2011) (“Congress has declined to follow the European model of a dedicated
privacy administrator.”); Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture
of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (describing the
debate between self-regulation and market solutions, and privacy rights and regulation).
72. See Helman, supra note 27, at 527–28 (showing that “in most cases in the United
States, individual firms, and in some contexts, industry groups, determine their own level
of privacy protection”). Examples of industry group regulation include, inter alia, the “Digital Advertising Alliance’s Self-Regulatory Program” for online behavioral advertising,
which enables users to opt out of some targeted advertising, and “www.aboutads.info,” a
partnership of public and private parties which provides information about online advertising. YourAdChoices Gives You Control, YOURADCHOICES, https://youradchoices.com/
[https://perma.cc/NNN7-GFJR].
73. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, § 5(a), 52 Stat. 111, 111–12 (1938) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45) (often referred to as Section 5 jurisdiction); see Marcia Hofmann, Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of Privacy, in PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A
GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE § 4:1.2 (Kristen J.
Mathews ed., 2012) (discussing the FTC’s authority under Section 5). The FTC also enforces
several privacy statutes and the Safe Harbor Agreement between the United States and the
European Union. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law
Enforcement, and Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Oct. 2019), http://www
.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [https://perma.cc/TR85-MPGP] (“[T]he
Commission enforces a variety of other consumer protection statutes . . . prohibit[ing] specifically defined [trade] practices [and] . . . generally specify[ing] that violations . . . be
treated as if they were ‘unfair or deceptive’ acts or practices under Section 5(a),” including
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not covered by other laws began occupying a larger share of the
privacy landscape, the FTC became a primary source of privacy
regulation—more than nearly any privacy statute or common law
tort.74 The fact that virtually none of the FTC’s rulings have been
challenged in court has fortified the powerful position of the
agency,75 and some commentators now view it as the most influential regulating force in the United States.76
Considering the complex mosaic of privacy law, it is difficult to
ascertain coherent doctrines of privacy recognition, violation, and
remedies, as were easily portrayed for trade secret law.77 One doctrine that emerges as relatively constant across the different
norms concerns the “expectations of privacy” standard. Except for
the particular sectoral norms, which have their own conditions,
virtually all sources of privacy law determine that an actual or subjective expectation of privacy is paramount to establish a privacy

the Truth-in-Lending Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, and Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act).
74. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 586–88 (“The statutory law regulating privacy is diffuse and discordant, and common law torts fail to regulate the majority of activities concerning privacy.”); Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
809, 811–12 (2011) (tracing the development of the FTC’s role in consumer protection enforcement). See generally CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY
LAW AND POLICY (2016).
75. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 610–13 (discussing why companies do not
challenge FTC rulings in court).
76. Id. at 586–87 (noting that, in practice, “FTC privacy jurisprudence is the broadest
and most influential regulating force on information privacy in the United States”).
77. See supra section I.A.
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claim.78 “Expectations of privacy” is a vague standard.79 Courts’
analyses focus on whether the plaintiff can expect that the information at issue remains private, considering how the information
became available to the defendant in the first place.80 In particular,

78. The “expectations of privacy” standard has originated in the context of privacy infringements by the state. Early jurisprudence fostered a broader view, following the seminal
1890 paper by Warren and Brandeis. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195, 201 (1890) (rejecting the view that expectations of
privacy are required to establish a privacy claim); see, e.g., Leverton v. Curtis Publ’g Co.,
192 F.2d 974, 976–78 (3d Cir. 1951); Strickler v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 68, 71
(S.D. Cal. 1958); Banks v. King Features Syndicate, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939);
Reed v. Real Detective Publ’g Co., 162 P.2d 133, 138–39 (Ariz. 1945); Gill v. Curtis Publ’g
Co., 239 P.2d 630, 634–35 (Cal. 1952); Roberts v. McKee, 29 Ga. 161, 164–65 (1859); Eick v.
Perk Dog Food Co., 106 N.E.2d 742, 745–47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 S.W.
849, 850 (Ky. Ct. App. 1912); Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297, 212–13 (La. 1811); Baker
v. Libbie, 97 N.E. 109, 111 (Mass. 1912); Bennett v. Gusdorf, 53 P.2d 91 (Mont. 1935); Edison
v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 394–95 (N.J. Ch. 1907); Gautier v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 107 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 1952); Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 103 N.E. 1108,
1109–11 (N.Y. 1913); Holmes v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 233 N.Y.S. 153, 155 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1929); Myers v. U.S. Camera Publ’g Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d 771, 774 (N.Y. City Ct.
1957); Lawrence v. Ylla, 55 N.Y.S.2d 343, 346 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945); Mackenzie v. Soden
Mineral Springs Co., 18 N.Y.S. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891); Bartholomew v. Workman, 169
P.2d 1012, 1013–14 (Okla. 1946); Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distrib. Corp., 272 P.2d
177 (Utah 1954); Pollard v. Photographic Co., [1888] 40 Ch. 345 (Eng.). The turning point
was the case of United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where the Supreme Court stated
that “what [a person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at 351–52 (citation omitted). The Katz decision intended to expand the right to privacy by shifting the question away from the location where
private information was accessed. But it had the opposite effect. See Sandeen, supra note
31, at 695 (“Ironically, although the expectation of privacy doctrine was used in Katz to
expand the defendant’s zone of privacy, it is often applied to limit the types of information
protected under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”); see also Doe v. Mills, 536 N.W.2d 824,
831 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that importing a Fourth Amendment ruling into all privacy cases may be a misapplication of Katz).
79. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 919, 920–21 (2005) (noting the lack of a “coherent [and] consistent methodology for
determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular
fact that has been shared with one or more persons”); see also Kay Connelly, Ashraf Khalil
& Yong Liu, Do I Do What I Say?: Observed Versus Stated Privacy Preferences 622–23
(2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-54074796-3_61.pdf [https://perma.cc/BP74-P4L3] (noting that people express different privacy
expectations in their words and in their actions).
80. E.g., Pearce v. Whitenack, 440 S.W.3d 392, 401 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014) (“‘Nor is there
liability for observing him or even taking his photograph while he is walking on the public
highway, since he is not then in seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the
public eye.’ . . . By analogy, Pearce’s Facebook posting was a walk on the Internet, the information super-highway.” (citation and emphasis omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c)); People v. Stipo, 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 688, 691 (Ct. App. 2011) (“A
subscriber has no expectation of privacy in the subscriber information he supplies to his
Internet provider. Therefore, his challenge to a warrant requiring his Internet provider to
identify him through his Internet Protocol (IP) address has no merit.”); see also Sandeen,
supra note 31, at 696, 702 (“[C]ourts tend to focus so much on whether the information was
disclosed that they ignore the context and purpose of disclosure.”); Solove, supra note 54, at
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courts inspect whether the plaintiff herself originally revealed the
information.81 While clearly not any disclosure by the plaintiff
would negate a finding of “expectations of privacy,”82 a standard
that turns on initial consent to sharing weakens the plaintiff’s position—especially today, where users do not always have much of
a choice but to share information.83
As in trade secrecy, violators of privacy may or may not have a
prior relationship with the subject.84 Individuals can suffer privacy
harms that result from actions by, say, their social network,85 but
they can also suffer from actions by data brokers with whom they
have no prior relationship, and who collected their data without
their knowledge.86 In both cases, it is often difficult for the plaintiff
to show that the violator infringed their expectations of privacy,

1431 (“Privacy law was developed largely to address privacy problems of disclosure and surveillance, and consequently was aimed at protecting secrets and concealed information.”).
81. Sandeen, supra note 31, at 702.
82. See, e.g., Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1218 (Cal. 2007) (finding that information
can be private despite limited disclosure by the plaintiff); M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107
Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 511–12 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a photo is protected despite circulation within community); Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 244 Cal. Rptr. 556, 561 (Ct.
App. 1988) (finding that a person’s identity is private despite disclosure to friends, neighbors, family, and police); Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, 492 A.2d 580, 587 (D.C. 1985) (holding
that limited disclosure of plastic surgery to family and friends does not negate privacy finding); Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 494 n.1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Y.G.
v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 500–02 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that medial information can be private despite disclosure to, inter alia, to medical personnel); see
also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Consent, Aesthetics, and the Boundaries of Sexual Privacy After
Lawrence v. Texas, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 671, 683 (2005) (“[I]n a plurality of states, disclosing
information to a network of friends, relatives, and even some strangers, does not necessarily
waive a plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of privacy for the purposes of tort law.”). But see
infra text accompanying note 86.
83. See, e.g., JOSEPH TUROW, MICHAEL HENNESSY & NORA DRAPER, THE TRADEOFF
FALLACY: HOW MARKETERS ARE MISREPRESENTING AMERICAN CONSUMERS AND OPENING
THEM UP TO EXPLOITATION 3 (2015), https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2QB-Q7TC] (explaining users’ putting up with privacy-invasive practices not by a theory of willful choice, but by a theory of resignation, namely a
belief that an “undesirable outcome is inevitable” and a feeling of helplessness to change it);
Helman, supra note 27, at 537–38 (discussing the limited choice users have in the context
of using social media); Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer
Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 164–65 (discussing the “take it or leave it”
nature of online privacy deals); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1087, 1152 (2002) (“Life in the modern Information Age often involves exchanging information with third parties, such as phone companies, Internet service providers, cable companies, merchants, and so on. Thus, clinging to the notion of privacy as total secrecy would
mean the practical extinction of privacy in today’s world.”).
84. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
85. See generally Helman, supra note 27.
86. See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
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considering that in many cases today the plaintiff initially surrendered the information willingly.87
The “expectations of privacy” standard is the backbone of FTC
rulemaking as well.88 But the FTC takes a broader, probably more
realistic approach to “expectations of privacy,” which does not turn
on the initial disclosure of the information.89 Rather, the FTC considers the entire relationship between the user and the alleged privacy violator and takes an expansive view of “expectations of privacy” as a moving target that changes with time, technology, and
market trends.90
As the above discussion demonstrates, the protection of information under trade secret law is strikingly superior to the protection provided to private information under privacy law. The next
section delves into the doctrines that give rise to the differences in
protection.
C. Doctrinal Comparison
As discussed above, trade secret law provides greater protection
than does privacy law. Below, I uncover the main doctrinal differences that lead to this reality.
1. What Can Be a Secret?
In principle, neither firms’ secrets nor private secrets need to be
confined to specific types of information. Different firms and individuals may need protection for different types of information.

87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
88. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 667 (“Although the FTC began enforcing
broken promises of privacy, its focus seems to have shifted to broken expectations of consumer privacy.”).
89. See id. (“[A]ctions for deception have been based on expectations created by marketing materials, user manuals, pop-up windows, emails, privacy settings, icons, and various
other aspects of a website’s or software program’s design.” (citations omitted)).
90. Id.; see also Fred H. Cate & Robert Litan, Constitutional Issues in Information Privacy, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 61 (2002) (“The public’s expectations of privacy are changing, as are the many influences that shape those expectations, such as technology, law, and experience.”); Adam Thierer, A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in
Digital Privacy Debates, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1055, 1101–02 (2013) (describing a resistance, adaptation, assimilation cycle towards privacy-related technologies). See generally
ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM PLYMOUTH
ROCK TO THE INTERNET (2000) (examining the changing conceptions of privacy throughout
American history).
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Some firms, for example, can deem chemical formulas confidential,91 while others may require protection of their financials.92
Likewise, some individuals may find their health status sensitive,
while others may wish to conceal their social or romantic relationships.93 The law, however, gives effect to this reality only in the
case of trade secrets. Under trade secret law, protection turns on
the firm’s views and behaviors regarding its information.94 If a firm
maintains the secrecy of valuable secret information, protection
will attach to the information.95
This is not the case in privacy law. Privacy law has taken an
objective, categorical view of what constitutes sensitive information. As discussed, federal and state laws have singled out certain categories of information for greater protection, such as medical or financial information, and, in some states, revenge
pornography.96 The ultra-protection zone applies to all people, with
no diversity or variability for individuals’ preferences. Granted,
this legal reality was created bit by bit rather than by any thoughtful, comprehensive legal development; nonetheless, this is the legal
landscape.97
Outside of the enhanced protection zones, the standard of privacy protection has turned on “expectations of privacy.” As discussed below, this standard offers inferior protection to the trade

91. The formula for Coca-Cola is probably the most famous example. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 294 (D. Del. 1985).
92. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
93. The scholarship that discussed heterogeneous privacy preferences typically focused
on the fact that some individuals generally value privacy more than others, and not on the
diverse types of information that individuals may require protection of. See, e.g., Ryan Calo,
Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 788 (2014) (“Consumer preferences are also
deeply heterogeneous. Some consumers wish for more privacy while others could not care
less.”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV.
2010, 2026 (2013) (“American attitudes toward privacy are highly heterogeneous”); Daniel
J. Gilman & James C. Cooper, There Is a Time to Keep Silent and a Time to Speak, the Hard
Part Is Knowing Which Is Which: Striking the Balance Between Privacy Protection and the
Flow of Health Care Information, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 279, 318 (2010)
(discussing the heterogeneity of privacy preferences in the context of health-related data);
Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1134–35 (“Although some individuals may value privacy so
highly that they will choose not to engage in market transactions about their personal data,
others may be quite willing to sell their personal data to firms A, B, and C (even if not to X,
Y, or Z).”).
94. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 55, 67.
97. See supra section I.B.
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secrecy standard of “efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain secrecy.”98
2. “Expectations of Privacy” Versus “Efforts That Are Reasonable
Under the Circumstances to Maintain Secrecy”
Trade secret protection attaches to valuable secret information
if the owner of the information is taking “efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain secrecy.”99 There is no
bright-line rule for what reasonable measures a secret holder must
take to meet this prerequisite. Clearly, some measures must be
taken,100 and these measures need to show that the holder indeed
viewed the information as secret in real time.101 The reasonableness of the precautions is also circumstantial, and would be relaxed, for example, in cases of close relationships with the person
who received the information.102
The privacy standard for protection is different. Except for the
categories that are covered by targeted federal and state laws, the

98. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985) (defining a trade
secret as information that, inter alia, is the subject of “efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy”).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Solid Wood Cabinet Co. v. Partners Home Supply, No. 13-3598, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 31655 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2015) (granting summary judgement to defendants
after finding no evidence of protective steps); Int’l Mezzo Techs., Inc. v. Frontline Aerospace,
Inc., No. 3:10-cv-00397-SCR, at *18 (M.D. La. Sept. 25, 2014) (“Although [the report at issue]
was marked as proprietary and confidential, the plaintiff did not introduce evidence to
demonstrate its affirmative efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information contained in
the report.”); SortiumUSA LLC v. Hunger, No. 3:11-cv-1656-M, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
191498, at *37 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2013) (granting a motion to dismiss based on plaintiff’s
failure to mark information as confidential, require the defendant to execute a confidentiality agreement, and “plead any other steps to protect the secrecy”).
101. See, e.g., Dryco, LLC v. ABM Indus., Inc., No. 07-CV-0069, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
97610 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2009) (finding that plaintiffs’ measures did not amount to reasonable attempts to keep the information confidential); Opus Fund Servs. (USA) LLC v. Theorem
Fund Servs., LLC, No. 17-C-923, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35569, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018)
(finding no proof that the plaintiff treated the secret as “any more confidential than all of
[plaintiff’s] internal information”); OTR Wheel Eng’g, Inc. v. W. Worldwide Servs., Inc., No.
CV-14-085-LRS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179509 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2015) (denying protection because there was no “Confidential” designation on the single document produced by
plaintiff regarding the alleged trade secret).
102. See JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 4.04[2][b] (2020) (“If evidence of a confidential
relationship and secrecy is strong, courts may relax the requirement to show reasonable
precautions.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. g (AM. LAW
INST. 1995) (“When other evidence establishes secrecy and the existence of a confidential
relationship, courts are properly reluctant to deny protection on the basis of alleged inadequacies in the plaintiff’s security precautions.”).
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standard of privacy protection turns on “expectations of privacy.”103
This standard means that information will be protected only to the
extent that the appropriator’s actions with it were against the subject’s expectations of privacy.
The “expectations of privacy” standard is not only different than
the trade secrecy “reasonable precautions” standard;104 it is strikingly narrower. First, as discussed, in court, the “expectations of
privacy” standard often turns on a plaintiff’s initial consent to disclosure, namely the binary question of whether the individual originally consented to the disclosure (or even made the disclosure herself).105 The problem is not only that, as discussed above, voluntary
sharing is involved in virtually all social and commercial interactions, especially online.106 Under this line of thinking, voluntary
sharing of information can be understood as consent to virtually
everything in the current digital landscape. Indeed, how can internet users prove reasonable “expectations of privacy” in light of the
common knowledge regarding the widespread practices of collecting, analyzing, storing, and scraping information?107 As Sharon
Sandeen puts it, “plaintiffs in privacy cases understandably assert
a bright line test: if personal information has been shared with others it cannot be the subject of a privacy claim.”108 While this interpretation might be somewhat exaggerated,109 it is true that the focus on how the information was originally made available to the
violator weakens the plaintiff’s position.110
103. See supra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.
104. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii).
105. See supra note 80.
106. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
107. See TUROW ET AL., supra note 83 (showing that individuals are aware of digital
practices and feel helpless towards them); Alessandro Acquisti, The Economics and Behavioral Economics of Privacy, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR
ENGAGEMENT 76, 87 (Julia Lane et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (“[A]fter an individual has released control of her personal information, she is in a position of information
asymmetry with respect to the party with whom she is transacting. In particular, the subject
might not know if, when, or how often the information she has provided will be used.”).
108. See Sandeen, supra note 31, at 696; see also Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955
P.2d 469, 491 (Cal. 1998) (finding no expectation of privacy with respect to events that occurred in public view); Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A
Theory of Willpower Norms, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1235, 1298 (2005) (“Traditionally, there is
an assumption of a single ‘public’ and thus rather minimal disclosures destroy any ‘expectation of privacy.’”); Karl D. Belgum, Who Leads at Half-Time?: Three Conflicting Visions of
Internet Privacy Policy, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 21 (1999) (“Plaintiffs repeatedly lose such
cases upon a showing that the fact in question was already in the public domain . . . .”).
109. See supra note 82.
110. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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Second, the “expectations of privacy” standard is not under the
immediate control of the secret owner. In the trade secrecy context,
employers routinely require employees and business associates to
sign nondisclosure agreements (“NDAs”) and return confidential
information upon their departure, in order to effectuate trade secrecy protection.111 But the law does not grant such constitutive effect to self-help precautions that individuals can take in the privacy context. Users can read privacy policies,112 inspect when a
service uses cookies to track them on other websites,113 use anonymous or fake identities,114 turn off location services, or use technologies that examine the data protection methods firms use.115 These
methods might be effective in the sense of interfering with data
collection, but they have no legal effect: if the measures do not work
(the equivalent of an NDA that was not followed), none of these (or
other) methods would guarantee privacy protection nor create an
obligation for the appropriator to avoid using their data.
Finally, the “expectations of privacy” standard has an adverse
dynamic effect. The harder it becomes to satisfy the standard, the
more users learn to expect less privacy.116 These lower expectations
111. NDAs seem to be necessary to receive protection, but they do not always suffice.
See, e.g., Opus Fund Servs. (USA) LLC v. Theorem Fund Servs., LLC, No. 17-C-923, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35569, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018) (“While ‘an agreement restricting the
use of information may be considered a reasonable step to maintain secrecy of a trade secret,’ such an agreement, without more, is not enough.” (quoting Fire ‘Em Up, Inc. v. Technocarb Equip. (2004) Ltd., 799 F. Supp. 2d 846, 851 (N.D. Ill. 2011))); Bison Advisors LLC
v. Kessler, No. 14-3121(DSD/SER), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107244, at *10 (D. Minn. Aug.
12, 2016) (“The law is clear that the mere existence of a confidentiality agreement is insufficient to establish that the covered information is a trade secret.”). Companies also use
NDAs because various privacy regimes require safeguarding of certain records. See, e.g.,
Menell, supra note 36, at 3, 17.
112. But see Helman, supra note 27, at 532 (discussing “[t]he uninformative nature of
privacy policies”); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 667 (citing surveys showing that users
do not read privacy policies).
113. See, e.g., COOKIE CHECKER, http://www.cookie-checker.com/ [https://perma.cc/KH
6U-N8JR].
114. But note that social networks’ Terms of Service typically forbid anonymous use. See,
e.g., Terms of Use, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [https://perma.cc/K9V7K723] (requiring users to “[u]se the same name that [they] use in everyday life” and
“[p]rovide accurate information about [themselves]”); User Agreement, LINKEDIN, https://
www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement#obligations [https://perma.cc/6ST2-JBY6] (“[Y]ou
will . . . [p]rovide accurate information . . . [and] [u]se your real name on your profile”). Even
when users can have anonymous profiles, such as on Tumblr, the firm itself can and does
track users’ activity. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, TUMBLR, https://www.tumblr.com/privacy/en
[https://perma.cc/QQH5-UBUU].
115. See, e.g., Security Data, SECURITY SCORECARD, https://securityscorecard.com/prod
uct/security-data [https://perma.cc/PE8Y-PQ6G].
116. See also Helman, supra note 27, at 560 (“[T]he more users would learn to expect
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feed back to the legal standard of “expectations of privacy” and
have the effect of further eroding these expectations.117
3. Third-Party Liability
Trade secrets and privacy protection can both last forever, but
they are terminated upon publication of the underlying information. Indeed, protection of trade secrets expires once the secrets
become known or if the owner stops protecting them.118 Similarly,
private information loses protection once the subject loses privacy
expectations, which typically follows publication of the information.119 Granted, the original misappropriator may well bear liability for a breach, and in a trade secret case will typically be enjoined from future usage.120 But monetary damages would often be
inadequate or unavailable to stem the loss of the secret being lost
for most practical purposes.121 This is particularly troubling in the
privacy context, where courts require proof of harm that is unrealistic for most victims, which means that damages from the original
misappropriator would often not be available at all.122
Trade secrecy is mindful of this effect and includes a notable limitation. Under trade secret law, liability does extend to third parties who use or disclose information that they “knew or had reason
to know” was obtained through improper means or in violation of
a confidentiality duty.123 This is a crucial rule. Holders of misappropriated secrets typically wish to use them via a third party—
either a competitor of the secret owner or a new entity of their own.
Yet, any third party who attempts to hire a holder of a competitor’s
secret in hopes of putting its hands on the secret is likely to be
enjoined.124
better privacy terms from online companies the more privacy they would be entitled to.”).
117. Id.
118. See Menell, supra note 36, at 47 (“Unfortunately, once a secret is divulged to the
public, it is not possible to obtain an injunction against those who have learned of the trade
secret legitimately. . . .”).
119. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
121. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1451–52 (2009); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Saving
Trade Secret Disclosures on the Internet Through Sequential Preservation, 42 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1, 45–46 (2007).
122. See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
123. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
124. Id.
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The prohibition on knowingly using a misappropriated secret is
in fact quite broad. In the extant jurisprudence, any derivative use
of the trade secret is impermissible—no matter how remote and
dissimilar the downstream use is to the original function of the secret.125 As Joseph Fishman and Deepa Varadarajan explain,
The case law seldom investigates whether the copied information was
a significant part of the plaintiff’s entitlement or whether the defendant’s use poses any threat of market harm. Instead, the test quickly
collapses into a binary question of whether exposure to the secret educated the defendant at all, regardless of what the defendant’s final
product or process ends up looking like.126

Banning any downstream use of a misappropriated secret is a
broad—perhaps too broad—feature of trade secrecy.127 And it
stands in sharp contrast to privacy law. Privacy law includes no
prohibition on the use of data that was obtained illegally, let alone
data that was obtained through violation of the data subject’s expectations of privacy. Information in the data-trafficking industry
is often hacked and resold, and laundered so many times that its
sources become indistinguishable at some point.128 Data brokers
routinely purchase data from entities that acquire the information
from blatantly illegal sources.129 And to alleviate a concern of any
claim of willful blindness or plausible deniability, data brokers
rarely “affirmatively evaluate the legitimacy, stability, and quality
of their sources before accepting data from them.”130 The collection,
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
1995) (“Even if the defendant’s final product or process differs significantly from that of the
plaintiff, substantial use of the trade secret in the course of the defendant’s research can be
sufficient to constitute an appropriation.”).
126. See Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 35, at 1054 (criticizing this caselaw).
127. See id. Note that this broad provision applies not only with regard to third parties
but with regard to any downstream use of a trade secret. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
128. See Scholz, supra note 26, at 666 (“By the time the most legitimate data traffickers,
such as the ones interviewed by the FTC, choose to purchase access to the data, the sources
of the data have become unclear.”).
129. Id. at 665–66 (arguing also that the ability to sell hacked data provides an incentive
for hackers to steal data—because they can launder it through data trafficking companies).
Illegal methods include, for example, hacking into private databases in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, or exceeding the limitation of use of the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721–2725, or that of state laws restricting the
use of voter registration information. Id. at 665–66 n.61; see Voter List Information, U.S.
ELECTIONS PROJECT, http://voterlist.electproject.org [https://perma.cc/V8SL-NB5X] (last
updated Aug. 22, 2015); see also David Thaw, Criminalizing Hacking, Not Dating: Reconstructing the CFAA Intent Requirement, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 907, 926–42 (2013)
(showing that these actions can be illegal).
130. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
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use, or disclosure of this information by data brokers is not inhibited a bit by the fact that this data was originally obtained while
infringing on privacy rights.
4. Remedies
As discussed previously, a successful trade secret case is likely
to yield permanent injunctions, alongside compensation—actual
damages or unjust enrichment, and in suitable cases, exemplary
damages and attorneys’ fees.131 Misappropriation of trade secrets
is also a criminal offense.132
In contrast, privacy law features incoherent remedies. Beyond
specific federal or state laws, injunctions are fairly rare, although
some courts are sometimes open to this remedy.133 Damages are
also difficult to obtain. Under both tort and contract theories of liability, courts require plaintiffs to show concrete harm.134 Ryan
ACCOUNTABILITY, at iv, 16 (2014) [hereinafter DATA BROKERS], https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade
-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9CE-E8X6].
131. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2–4 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
132. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376; see also
United States v. O’Rourke, 417 F. Supp. 3d 996 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (enforcing criminally attempted misappropriation despite lack of secrets); Orly Lobel, The DTSA and the New Secrecy Ecology, 1 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 369, 372–73 (2017) (noting a serious increase of criminal enforcement measures pertaining to trade secrecy under the
Economic Espionage Act).
133. See, e.g., Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that
plaintiffs were eligible for compensatory damages, restitution, injunctive relief, or punitive
damages for privacy violations).
134. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (stating that a plaintiff
must show a concrete, discernible injury rather than a “conjectural or hypothetical” one for
standing in federal court (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983))); In re
LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 932 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding no “resulting damages of [the] alleged breach” of contract); Rudgayzer v. Yahoo! Inc., No. 5:12-CV01399 EJD, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161302, at *18–19 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (finding no
actual harm to support a privacy claim of breach of contract); Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F.
Supp. 2d 1010, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (rejecting embarrassment and property-based theories
of harm as insufficient in contract-based privacy claim); In re Facebook Privacy Litig., No.
C 10-02389 JW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147345, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011) (rejecting
plaintiffs’ claim that they suffered “appreciable and actual damage” in contract-based suit);
Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. 09-4567 (RBK/KMW),
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43360, at *30–31 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010) (dismissing contract-based
claim because plaintiff failed to show loss flowing from the alleged breach); Cherny v. Emigrant Bank, 604 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the release of an email
address does not constitute sufficient injury); see also Lawrence Friedman, Establishing Information Privacy Violations: The New York Experience, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 651, 653–55,
659–61 (2003) (discussing two New York cases in which the court required plaintiffs to show
actual harm to property or monetary loss).
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Calo has observed that courts have tended to use a particularly
strict harm standard for privacy cases.135 The heightened standard
may stem from the concern that privacy injuries are inherently
subjective, and relaxing the harm standard may yield unpredictable, excessive damages.136 Yet showing concrete privacy harms is
nearly impossible.137 Many privacy cases fail because of this prerequisite.138
Courts have recently begun exploring the territory of restitution
in privacy cases.139 Restitution, in brief, is liability for benefits received. Restitution lies when a person receives a benefit from another, in circumstances where, as between the two persons, it is
unjust for them to retain it.140 The theory suggests that using and
profiting from a person’s information without that person’s consent
135. See Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH.
L. 361, 361 (2014) (“[C]ourts and some scholars require a showing of harm in privacy out of
proportion with other areas of law.”). For scholarship that proposed more achievable ways
to measure privacy harms, see, e.g., Paul Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907
(2013); M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011); Danielle
Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and Private Law at the Dawn
of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241 (2007).
136. See Scholz, supra note 26, at 656 (“Courts worry that recognizing the privacy right
in the absence of a clearly defined concrete harm may lead to unpredictable, excessive damages based on plaintiffs’ subjective perceptions.”).
137. Id. at 655 (discussing the “‘harm problem’ . . . the difficulty in defining a measurable
economic harm issuing from privacy infringements”). See generally Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737
(2018).
138. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 134.
139. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 995.50 (“The right of privacy is recognized in this state. One
whose privacy is unreasonably invaded is entitled to the following relief: . . . [c]ompensatory
damages based either on plaintiff’s loss or defendant’s unjust enrichment; and [a] reasonable amount for attorney fees.”); Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012) (recognizing a claim for unjust enrichment); Fero v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d
735 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (discussing plaintiffs’ restitution claim); Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136
F. Supp. 3d 654 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (discussing plaintiffs’ restitution claim); Fraley v. Facebook,
Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying motion to dismiss on unjust enrichment
claims); State v. Moua, 874 N.W.2d 812 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016) (finding victims of identity
theft entitled to restitution). Some states explicitly confer restitution upon privacy cases.
See Scholz, supra note 26, at 659 (endorsing restitution as a remedy and as a cause of action).
140. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. LAW
INST. 2011) (“A person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution.”); Scholz, supra note 26, at 680 (“Harm or unjust enrichment arises
from data processing or data dissemination when: (1) there is a relationship of trust between
the two parties that makes it reasonable for the plaintiff to expect her data would not be
handled in that way; and/or (2) society deems it morally wrong or outrageous for data to be
processed or disseminated in such a way; and/or (3) the information is being processed or
disseminated by the defendant in a way that [either] subjected [the] plaintiff to harm [or
risk of harm or unjustly enriched the defendant].”).
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is unjust. Restitution as a cause of action couples with restitution
as a form of relief (and the latter can be available without the former).141 While not free of problems of its own,142 in suitable cases,
this path obviates the requirement of harm, which often precludes
relief from privacy victims.143 Despite this new path for recovery,
for now, lawsuits against privacy intrusions are often unsuccessful.144
To a large extent, together with privacy regulation more generally, privacy enforcement has become the domain of the FTC. But
as an administrative enforcement agency—and as will be expanded upon below—the FTC is confined to enforcement measures
that are not easily translated to relief for the injured parties.
5. Institutions
The inferiority of privacy law in terms of remedies, as discussed
above,145 is also a product of the different institutions that trade
secret owners and privacy victims have de facto access to. As discussed, courts form an effective venue for trade secret holders to
combat the misappropriation of their rights. In court, plaintiffs can
request compensation, restitution, and injunctive relief.146 By contrast, courts are playing an increasingly marginal role in privacy
lawmaking, leaving the arena for administrative rulemaking by
the FTC.147 As Daniel Solove and Woodrow Hartzog put it, if there
is any common law on privacy today, it is within the FTC.148

141. See generally Scholz, supra note 26. The FTC is also authorized to apply restitutionary remedies. See 15 U.S.C. § 45.
142. See, e.g., Jan Whittington & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90
N.C. L. REV. 1327, 1328 (2012) (stating that individuals have difficulty in determining the
value of the data they are trading).
143. See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text; see also Sandeen, supra note 31, at
706 (noting that nothing requires us to limit available causes of action to ones that are designed to compensate for economic loss); Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577, 1591 (2002) (noting that there are two principle types of
monetary remedies available: (1) damages, where relief is measured by loss to plaintiff; and
(2) restitution, where relief is measured by gain of defendant.).
144. See Anita Bernstein, Real Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457, 1475
(2012); see also Scholz, supra note 26, at 653.
145. See supra section I.B.
146. See supra section I.A.
147. See supra section I.B; see also Bernstein, supra note 144, at 1475 (noting that privacy cases typically fail in court).
148. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 619 (discussing “[t]he Privacy ‘Common
Law’ of the FTC”).
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Absent broad jurisdiction and general authority to issue civil
penalties,149 the FTC is restricted to investigating companies for
alleged privacy violations and reaching settlements with them
through consent orders.150 The FTC’s authority to design consent
orders is broad.151 Consent orders can include, for example, financial sanctions, prohibitions on future activities, and reporting, audit, and compliance requirements for up to twenty years.152
While these enforcement measures may sound extensive, they
barely pose a real threat to companies. To begin with, the nature
of a consent order is that it involves the privacy violator in designing the settlement.153 Second, the sanctions themselves are not
particularly severe. Financial sanctions (including penalties and
monetary corrective measures such as disgorgement of revenues)
are relatively modest, partially because they must reflect, inter
alia, consumer loss—a major obstacle in the privacy context.154 The
ban on future activities is essentially a ban on activities that are
forbidden anyway. For example, companies accused of misrepresenting information to users were prohibited from making future
misrepresentations.155 Indeed, as part of settlements, companies
often agree to delete or refrain from using information that was
gained through the investigated privacy violations;156 but again,
this information was barred from use in the first place. FTC cases
may also bring bad press,157 but their actual reputational damage

149. See id. at 605 (noting that “the FTC lacks the general authority to issue civil penalties”); Robert Gellman, A Better Way to Approach Privacy Policy in the United States: Establish a Non-Regulatory Privacy Protection Board, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1183, 1205 (2003)
(“The FTC[] . . . does not have jurisdiction over many private sector, non-profit, and governmental record keepers.”).
150. The FTC can fine companies for violating consent orders, but such violations are
rare. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 605.
151. Id. at 613 (noting that the FTC has unrestrained power to design consent orders).
152. See id. at 613–14.
153. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., United States v. Danube Carpet Mills, Inc., 737 F.2d 988, 993 (11th Cir.
1984) (indicating “injury to the public” as a factor in determining penalty amount); see also
supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
155. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 155–56; see also Stipulated Final Order for
Permanent Injunction at 5, FTC v. Frostwire LLC, No. 1:11-cv-23643-DLG (S.D. Fla. Oct.
12, 2011) (restraining defendants from misrepresenting that consumers’ computers are not
publicly sharing downloaded files).
156. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 616.
157. See id. at 606 (“Beyond fines, cases bring bad press.”).
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is dubious, especially considering the rampant privacy intrusions
that the public has learned to expect.158
In fairness, the FTC has been able to compel companies to agree
to measures that can improve future privacy practices. For example, companies have agreed to “comprehensive privacy program[s],”159 and to subject such programs to third-party supervision.160 Yet overall, what looks like solid FTC enforcement may
only appear so in comparison to the ineffectiveness of other privacy
regulators.161 In reality, the agency’s enforcement mechanisms depend on companies’ voluntary cooperation. This cooperation may
be stemming from fear of a long and tedious auditing process or of
a scenario where the agency would push for privacy legislation that
would jeopardize the self-regulation regime.162
Beyond remedies, the fact that privacy becomes the domain of
the FTC has other disadvantages for privacy protection. Administrative agencies are prone to capture and public choice problems,
which may partially explain their soft hand towards companies
that they regulate.163 Some commentators have also criticized the
FTC for acting arbitrarily and providing little guidance to companies, although this may be changing slightly.164
158. See Jake Nevrla, Voluntary Surveillance: Privacy, Identity and the Rise of Social
Panopticism in the Twenty-First Century, 6 COMM-ENTARY 5, 5–6 (2010) (“Societal norms
have inevitably adapted to this new medium of communication and the level of surveillance
that has come with it.”); TUROW ET AL., supra note 83, at 3–4.
159. E.g., Decision and Order at 4, In re Google, Inc., FTC File No. 102-3136, Docket No.
C-4336 (Oct. 13, 2011) (consent order).
160. See id. at 5; see also Agreement Containing Consent Order at 6, In re Facebook, Inc.,
FTC File No. 092-3184, Docket No. C-4365 (Nov. 29, 2011).
161. See supra section I.A.
162. Ryan Moshell, . . . And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory
United States Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 357, 383 (2005) (discussing “FTC’s inadequacy and toothlessness in ensuring privacy
protection”).
163. See Richard Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 935
n.104 (1985) (“‘Capture’ refers to the tendency of some agencies to favor the industry they
are required to regulate by protecting the industry from outside competition and stifling
innovation that threatens the status quo in the industry.” (citing Roger G. Noll, The Behavior of Regulatory Agencies, 29 REV. SOC. ECON. 15 (1971))); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050 (1997) (“[A]gencies were
likely to become ‘captured’ by the business organizations that they are charged with regulating.”).
164. See Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data
Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 689–
94 (2013) (“[The] inherent ambiguity [of unfairness authority] can be dangerous for regulated entities . . . .”); Michael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security
Breach Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 165–71
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Finally, the dominant rulemaking by the FTC compared to
courts has a self-perpetuating effect. This reality adversely influences the incentives of privacy victims to bring lawsuits. In turn,
the scarcity of lawsuits prevents development of tort and contract
doctrines to the extant privacy challenges and self-perpetuates the
reliance on the FTC.
* * *
In sum, even though both trade secrecy and privacy law are designed to protect information that the owner or subject of which
deems secret, the inferiority of privacy protection is unmistakable.
Individuals do not have the privilege that firms have, to decide for
themselves which pieces of information about them deserve enhanced protection. None of the safeguards that firms can take to
trigger protection of their secrecy are of any avail to individuals,
because the law would not give effect to such measures. While
trade secrecy includes protection of downstream conscious use of
misappropriated secrets, privacy protection does not extend
against third parties. Privacy remedies also pale in comparison to
the remedies available to trade secret owners, reflecting the general disarray of privacy law. Finally, the stagnation in courts on
privacy cases has created a critical institutional effect. Below, I
consider whether this divergence is justified and whether some
harmonization of the two regimes can provide a better way forward.
II. CONSIDERING HARMONIZATION
A. The Case for (Some) Harmonization of Trade Secrecy and
Privacy Law
Why is it that trade secrecy is so much better protected than
privacy law? One explanation has to do with legal history. Sharon
Sandeen has studied the development of both trade secret law and
privacy law, from common law to tort law to the extant state.165

(2008) (“No guidelines exist under which the Commission will act or refrain from acting if a
data security breach occurs.”). But see Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 606–27, 648–66
(refuting these arguments).
165. See Sandeen, supra note 31.
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She concluded that while many parallels exist between the development of these laws, at some point in time, trade secrecy jurisprudence grew while privacy common law ceased to evolve.166
Another (or complementary) explanation for the protection gap
between the regimes may concern their normative approval: privacy law does not enjoy the wall-to-wall normative support that
trade secret law enjoys. Trade secrets’ justification is supposedly
evident.167 Neither scholars nor courts seriously dispute that companies have legitimate reasons for limiting the disclosure of their
proprietary information.168 In contrast, privacy skeptics abound,169
and even among supporters, the underpinnings of privacy law are
subject to fierce debates.170 The undisputed normative basis of
trade secrecy translates to an eloquent trade secret law, while the
dubious privacy grounds are echoed in the heightened standards
for privacy liability and in the reluctance to extend existing doctrines to contemporary privacy harms.171
Not only are privacy rights contested, but it is not even clear
what kind of interests they form, unlike trade secret law. In theory,
under the classic framework for the distinction between liability
166. Id. at 687, 692 (arguing that “unlike trade secret law, information privacy law has
not fully developed”, partially because “[i]nformation privacy concerns are more personal
and are unlikely to garner the attention of attorneys until there is a gross invasion of privacy”).
167. See infra notes 178–91 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 36, at 8 (conceding that firms have a legitimate interest
in maintaining secrecy even with regards to “the disclosure of proprietary information that
allegedly reveals illegal activity”). But cf. Lobel, supra note 132 (arguing that the interest
of secrecy needs to be balanced against the interest of openness in order to promote innovation); Robert G. Bone, The (Still) Shaky Foundations of Trade Secret Law, 92 TEX. L. REV.
1803, 1807–08 (2014) (expressing skepticism that “trade secret law generates incentive benefits that exceed its costs”).
169. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, A Feeling of Unease About Privacy Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 52, 52 (2006); Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978);
Adam Thierer, The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control Is Failing, 36
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 409, 414–17 (2013); see also Chi Ling Chan, Privacy Is (Not) Dead,
STAN. DAILY (Oct. 7, 2014), https://www.stanforddaily.com/2014/10/07/privacy-is-not-dead/
[https://perma.cc/T4LW-YNWL]; Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says
Facebook Founder, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy [https://perma.cc/4TXZ-X4FQ].
170. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 142–63
(1999) (advocating the use of property rights to enhance privacy protection); Friedman, supra note 134, at 652; Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1193, 1259–65 (1998); Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight:
Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 26–41 (1996);
Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2385 (1996); see also supra note 169 and accompanying text.
171. See supra section I.B.
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and property as described by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, both trade secrets and privacy interests could be viewed as
dualistic.172 Both have some property features, but the right to exclude from access or use of the information that they entail is circumstantial and is not freestanding against the world.173 Yet, the
legal reality is that trade secrecy is comfortably branded as intellectual property,174 while privacy remains wandering.175 This misfit of privacy law has adverse implications. As Lauren Henry
Scholz explains,
Classifying and describing the type of interest—be it a personal interest, a property interest, or some other type of interest—allows courts
to decide cases through comparison to other cases implicating the

172. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
173. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917)
(“The word property as applied to . . . trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain
secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant
knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present
matter is not property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential
relations with the plaintiffs . . . .”); Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (1868) (recognizing
a property right in a trade secret, but also recognizing that “he has not indeed an exclusive
right to it as against the public, or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it;
but he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to disclose
it to third persons”); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1283, 1284–85 (2000) (outlining skeptical perspectives on privacy as property); Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1129; Lauren Henry Scholz, Privacy as Quasi-Property, 101 IOWA
L. REV. 1113, 1116, 1131 (2016) (categorizing both privacy and trade secrecy as quasi-property).
174. See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSON, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01
(2020) (listing cases describing trade secrets as property and intellectual property); see, e.g.,
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) (“Trade secrets have many of the
characteristics of more tangible forms of property. A trade secret is assignable. A trade secret can form the res of a trust, and it passes to a trustee in bankruptcy.” (citations omitted));
Tabor v. Hoffman, 23 N.E. 12, 12 (N.Y. 1889) (holding that “an inventor or author, has, by
the common law, an exclusive property in his invention or composition”); Peabody, 98 Mass.
at 458 (recognizing a property right in a trade secret, but also recognizing that “he has not
indeed an exclusive right to it as against the public, or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it; but he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect
against one who in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to
his own use, or to disclose it to third persons”).
175. See Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1170–71 (“[A] serious impediment to a comprehensive approach [to privacy] in the U.S. is the lack of clarity in this country about the
nature of the interest that individuals have in information about themselves: Is it a commodity interest, a consumer protection interest, a personal dignity interest, a civil right
interest, all of the above, or no interest at all?”).
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same type of interest. . . . Since privacy has not been consistently approached as either property or a personal interest, courts have hesitated to compare privacy cases to anything but other privacy cases.176

The result is a vibrant trade secrecy jurisprudence and a privacy
law that gets a cold shoulder from courts.177
Historical or normative roots for the divergence of the laws obviously do not justify maintaining such deviation. The discussion
below aims to demonstrate that such a deviation is not justified
today, if indeed it has ever been. The first subsection below will
analyze the core justifications of trade secrecy and argue that they
are valid in the privacy context as well, even though they do not
capture the theoretical and normative depth of privacy protection.
In the second subsection, I discuss how collisions of trade secrecy
and privacy law are increasingly common, and why maintaining
the doctrinal gap between the regimes has an amplifying effect on
the inferiority of privacy interests.
1. The Shared Objectives of Trade Secrecy and Privacy
a. Innovation Policy
First and foremost, trade secrecy is justified as innovation policy—it encourages companies to engage in innovation that requires
sharing of information internally or with business partners.178 In-

176. See Scholz, supra note 173, at 1114.
177. Id. at 1115–16 (“In an era where the development of technology inevitably outpaces
the development of preexisting law, common law plays a significant role.”); see also Bruce
P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other
Common Law Theories of Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401,
428 (1998) (“It stands to reason that the faster a technology develops, the more rapidly it
will surpass preexisting law, and the more prominent common law theories may become. It
is not surprising, therefore, that as the Internet geometrically expands its speed, accessibility, and versatility—thereby vastly increasing the opportunities for economic free-riders to
take, copy, and repackage information and information systems for profit—intellectual
property owners again must consider the common law as a source of protection at the end
of this century, much as it was at the beginning.”).
178. See Menell, supra note 36, at 36 (“[T]rade secret protection augments other intellectual property protections in promoting innovation. It encourages companies to invest in
their workforce and facilitates a productive environment for technological progress.”); David
D. Friedman, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Trade Secret
Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 64 (1991) (contending that trade secrecy “supplements the patent
system” and that it “provides a means of internalizing the benefits of innovation”); Mark A.
Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV.
311, 329 (2008) (arguing that trade secrets share “two critical features . . . with other IP
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deed, trade secret law, like other intellectual property law, is designed to confront the concern that in a free market, too little information sharing would occur.179 As Arrow’s disclosure paradox
famously shows, without legal protection information would not be
shared, because “in order to sell the information, [the seller] must
disclose it to the potential buyer, but once she does, she has nothing
left to sell.”180 Trade secrecy is thus designed to facilitate safe sharing of information. Clearly, uncareful sharing is also not desired.
To drive efficient results for innovation, companies need to be
mindful about sharing. Trade secret law achieves this balance by
requiring companies to safeguard their information sharing, a
standard that encourages careful and conscious sharing of information.
What current law is missing, though, is that information privacy
law shares the same mission. It is mistakenly assumed that to encourage innovation in data-intensive sectors, a lax privacy standard is preferred.181 Arguably, the fewer limitations imposed on collecting, analyzing, and using people’s private information, the
fewer constraints on developing and experimenting with big-data
usage and business models.182 The main flaw in this theory is ignoring the supply chain: users’ provision of data. Indeed, the law
does not value private disclosure nearly as much as commercial
disclosure. In fact, privacy law treats disclosure like a fault. As discussed above, the “expectations of privacy” standard practically denies protection of much of the information that was originally

rights—they promote inventive activity and they promote disclosure of those inventions”).
The Supreme Court has echoed that justification. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 485 (1974) (“Trade secret law will encourage invention in areas where patent law does
not reach, and will prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the discovery and
exploitation of his invention.”); id. at 486 (observing that, absent trade secret protection,
“[t]he holder of a trade secret would . . . hoard rather than disseminate knowledge” and
“[i]nstead, then, of licensing others to use his invention and making the most efficient use
of existing manufacturing and marketing structures within the industry, the trade secret
holder would . . . limit his utilization of the invention, thereby depriving the public of the
maximum benefit of its use”); see also, e.g., Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329
(7th Cir. 1984) (“The primary purpose of trade secret law is to encourage innovation and
development . . . .”).
179. See supra note 178.
180. See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of TechnologyIntensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1654 (2009).
181. See, e.g., Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 74 (2013) (explaining the tension between the virtues of big data
industries on the one hand and consumer privacy on the other).
182. Id. at 76–77 (giving examples of how firms use consumer data).
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shared voluntarily.183 The more a person is responsible for the original disclosure of her private information, the less protection the
information will be awarded.184 The fact that privacy law frowns
upon any disclosure in a social and business world that encourages
disclosure leads to severe exposure to privacy risks.
This cannot be a sound policy in today’s economy, which is fueled
by personal data.185 Unlike trade secret holders, who are motivated
to share information and use safeguards, individuals are incentivized to do neither. On the one hand, sharing information voluntarily invites unforeseeable privacy risks. On the other hand, mindfully using safeguards while sharing information has no effect. It
does not pay to read privacy policies, to show preferences to services with more transparency, or to invest in other safeguards.186
For the data industry to develop in a welfare-maximizing manner,

183. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 78–83 and accompanying text.
185. See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1918–27 (2013)
(arguing that lack of privacy may harm innovation); Goldfarb & Tucker, supra note 69, at
85 (drawing on empirical analysis to argue that “ultimately privacy policy is interlinked
with innovation policy and consequently has potential consequences for innovation and economic growth,” and summarizing evidence that “privacy regulations directly affect the usage and efficacy of emerging technologies”); Ohm, supra note 135, at 927 (“Many companies
are actively reshaping their business models to try to profit from customer secrets.”); DATA
BROKERS, supra note 130, at 13; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN
AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 8
(2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commissionreport-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyrep
ort.pdf [https://perma.cc/S58Q-MY54] (“[Privacy protections] not only will help consumers
but also will benefit businesses by building consumer trust in the marketplace.”); H.R. 5777,
the “BEST PRACTICES Act,” and H.R. __, a Discussion Draft to Require Notice to and Consent of an Individual Prior to the Collection and Disclosure of Certain Personal Information
Relating to That Individual: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce Trade & Consumer Prot., 111th Cong. 125 (2010) (statement of Leslie Harris, President and Chief Executive Officer, Center for Democracy & Technology) (“Privacy is an essential building block
of trust in the digital age.”); John Rose, Christine Barton, Rob Souza & James Platt, The
Trust Advantage: How to Win with Big Data, BOS. CONSULTING GROUP (Nov. 6, 2013), https:
//www.bcg.com/publications/2013/marketing-sales-trust-advantage-win-with-big-data [http
s://perma.cc/4BYU-WLLX] (“In order for global companies to have the greatest possible access to personal data, consumers need to trust that this information will be well stewarded.”); Press Release, Carnegie Mellon Univ., Increasing Control over Release of Information Leads People to Divulge More Online, Carnegie Mellon Researchers Find (Nov. 28,
2012), https://www.cmu.edu/news/stories/archives/2012/november/nov28_informationcont
rol.html [https://perma.cc/FEP3-FFS8]; Data Privacy Is a Major Concern for Consumers,
TRUSTARC BLOG (Jan. 28. 2015), http://www.truste.com/blog/2015/01/28/data-privacy-conc
ern-consumers/ [https://perma.cc/Y588-U7FJ] (citing surveys that show “[c]onsumers consider data privacy to be a hot button issue”).
186. See also supra note 112.
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the same logic that leads to trade secrecy law needs to apply here
as well: privacy law needs to facilitate safe sharing of information.
b. Self-Help Measures
Trade secret law is also concerned that without protection, companies will invest in wasteful self-help measures for information
protection and surveillance of employees and business partners.
Indeed, trade secrecy provides an effective ex-post tool to remediate situations of disloyal partners, and thus obviates the need to
rely on expensive ex-ante inspections of business associates.
Notably, the concern of inefficient self-help measures that may
be taken to protect sensitive information is valid in the privacy
context as well. Because self-help measures are not recognized under the law, users do not have an incentive to use measures that
are desired from a societal standpoint. People increasingly react to
the lack of ineffective privacy protection by employing a range of
privacy-seeking strategies, from adoption of technical protections
to using fake profiles to self-censorship and withdrawal of content.187 The law creates no incentive to use privacy strategies that
are desired from a societal point of view, and so more and more
people use identity-obscuring techniques, turn on Virtual Private
Networks (“VPNs”) to mask their IP addresses, and engage in
other methods that may be effective to safeguard their information
from data-collectors, but may also be destructive from a societal
standpoint.188 Such methods not only constitute pure waste from a
societal point of view, but they may have negative externalities,

187. See, e.g., Jonathan Mayer, Government Hacking, 127 YALE L.J. 570, 576 (2017) (“Individuals and businesses are rapidly adopting technical protections.”); Danah Boyd & Eszter
Hargittai, Facebook Privacy Settings: Who Cares?, 15 FIRST MONDAY, no. 8, 2010, at 1 (finding an increase in youth’s practices to modify privacy settings on Facebook between 2009–
2010); Kevin Lewis, Jason Kaufman & Nicholas Christakis, The Taste for Privacy: An Analysis of College Student Privacy Settings in an Online Social Network, 14 J. COMPUTERMEDIATED COMM. 79 (2008).
188. See Helman, supra note 27, at 544–45 (demonstrating “privacy-seeking behaviors
such as adopting of technical protections, arranging privacy settings within social media
sites, using fake profiles, and practicing ‘self-censorship and withdrawal of content’”); Samantha Murphy, Facebook’s Facial-Recognition Acquisition Raises Privacy Concerns (June
25, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/06/25/facebook-facial-recognition-privac/ [https://perm
a.cc/NPW3-QV59] (“[S]ome users might exercise more caution with how they upload pictures.”).

HELMAN 552 (DO NOT DELETE)

482

2/10/2021 10:05 PM10:04 PM

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:447

such as interfering with law enforcement activities, slowing internet use, or generating other risks.189
c. Business Ethics
Even trade secrecy’s business ethics rationale applies to the privacy realm in today’s economy.190 The same concern that companies have—that a misappropriator will acquire an advantage over
them based on information that they develop and own—is now
shared by individuals. Indeed, privacy violators can use information about individuals in order to enhance their bargaining
power when dealing with them, such as by price discriminating
against them or exploiting their vulnerabilities.191
Indeed, while the underpinning of privacy law remains an ongoing exploration, the main justifications of trade secret law may give
grounds to adoption of some trade secrecy doctrines in the information privacy context.
2. Collisions of Trade Secrecy and Privacy Law
The importance of harmonization intensifies in view of the growing zone of collision between trade secrecy and privacy regimes. As

189. See Helman, supra note 27, at 544–45; Murphy, supra note 188.
190. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (noting “[t]he
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics” as an additional “polic[y] behind trade secret law”); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.
1970); Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 385 N.E.2d 1349, 1354–55 (Mass. 1979);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1939) (defining wrongful acquisition as means “which fall below the generally accepted standards of commercial morality
and reasonable conduct”).
191. See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 999 (2014)
(“Firms will increasingly be able to trigger irrationality or vulnerability in consumers”); Joseph Farrell, Can Privacy Be Just Another Good?, 10 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 251,
252 (2012) (“[L]oss of privacy could identify a consumer as having a high willingness to pay
for something, which can lead to being charged higher prices if the competitive and other
conditions for price discrimination are present.”); see, e.g., Authorization and Authentication
Based on an Individual’s Social Network, U.S. Patent No. 8,302,164 (filed July 22, 2004)
(“In a fourth embodiment of the invention, the service provider is a lender. When an individual applies for a loan, the lender examines the credit ratings of members of the individual’s social network who are connected to the individual through authorized nodes. If the
average credit rating of these members is at least a minimum credit score, the lender continues to process the loan application. Otherwise, the loan application is rejected.”). See
generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015) (discussing how powerful interests in the online
business abuse users’ secrets for profit).
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data becomes increasingly central for almost every business,192
more and more companies maintain vast customer databases.193
These databases are an obvious source of conflict because the content that they hold (personal data of customers) is the domain of
both trade secrecy and privacy law. Consumer databases can almost always be considered trade secrets of the firms that manage
them.194 Yet they are typically not perceived as “secrets” for privacy
purposes. The first implication of this insight is that if a database
is hacked and the information stolen, the trade secret owner can
sue, but absent any particular law that grants such a right to consumers, the information subjects cannot.195 This is absurd, considering that the leak exposes the subject to much greater harm than
the database owner, who can still use the database.196
The second implication of the fact that databases comprise a
trade secret but not a privacy right is that users can be barred from
accessing, challenging, or correcting the information in such databases—unless a particular law specifically grants them such a
right.197 This not only leads to the fact that these databases are
often full of incorrect and unverified data, which can be inefficient,198 but it also makes it more difficult for individuals who do

192. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
1417, 1426 (“Providers have what some have called ‘Google envy.’ Google has demonstrated
how to grow rapidly by monetizing user behavior, in their case by displaying advertisements
matching a users’ recent search queries.”).
193. See Malgieri, supra note 31; DATA BROKERS, supra note 130, at 13.
194. See infra section II.B.1 (discussing the criteria for establishing trade secrets).
195. See also William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 956 (1996) (“The balance of power between the
direct marketing industry and the consumers upon whose information it depends is currently tilted strongly in favor of the marketers.”); Craig D. Tindall, Argus Rules: The Commercialization of Personal Information, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 181. It may be possible for data subjects to file a lawsuit in data-leakage cases based on negligence or on
contractual obligations, or to file a complaint with the FTC.
196. See, e.g., Lee Rainie, Sara Kiesler, Ruogu Kang & Mary Madden, Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW INTERNET PROJECT (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.pewintern
et.org/2013/09/05/anonymity-privacy-and-security-online/ [https://perma.cc/3JE9-NLLH]
(finding that “[eleven percent] of internet users have had important personal information
stolen such as their Social Security Number, credit card, or bank account information”).
197. Granted, one of the most prominent principles of the United States self-regulatory
scheme is the individual’s right to have notice about the data gathered about herself and
the right to know how it will be used. But in practice this requirement is deemed satisfied
by privacy policies. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 55, at 593. But see Helman, supra note
27, at 532.
198. Clearly this “inefficiency” can also be desirable when these databases are not desired from a societal point of view to begin with.

HELMAN 552 (DO NOT DELETE)

484

2/10/2021 10:05 PM10:04 PM

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:447

not know what information firms hold about them to know that
they are imperiled or to prove their cases in court.199
As we have seen, trade secrets and privacy law bear fundamental similarities. They also share a basic objective: to encourage
mindful sharing of information to enable the flow of the economy
and future innovation. Moreover, the fact that trade secrecy is so
much stronger than privacy rights is not only a comparative factor
that goes to show that private secrets are treated unfairly. The relative strength of trade secrecy means that despite the exponentially increasing stakes for users, trade secrecy hands-down
trumps the privacy interests of users in learning or contesting
what firms know about them.200 A more balanced approach would
give privacy interests a fair game when users’ privacy rights are
infringed. In the next section, I explore ways that the law can level
the playing ground and enhance the protection of privacy law.201
This discussion is intended to be suggestive and is certainly not
comprehensive. The idea is to demonstrate a new way to conceptualize this matter, which can be expanded upon in subsequent scholarship.
B. Harmonization in Practice
To be sure, in highlighting the resemblance between trade secrecy and privacy law, I am mindful that there are differences between the regimes that are justified. For example, attaching property status to information in the privacy context would be highly
problematic, as other scholars have demonstrated.202 Some of the
changes that I propose herein should have probably been proposed
199. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, New Governance, Chief Privacy Officers, and the Corporate Management of Information Privacy in the United States: An Initial
Inquiry, 33 L. & POL’Y 477, 498–99 (2011) (citing an interview with an executive: “I hate to
say ‘what they don’t know won’t hurt them,’ but that’s really how I see it. If we buy personal
information . . . or pull some from another database, there’s never any way the customers
will know about it . . . they won’t ever be able to figure out . . . how can they complain?”
(alterations in original)).
200. A superficial solution that would also grant users control over these databases, like
the European model, would lead to “schizophrenic law” where both users and trade secret
holders can control the same source. See Malgieri, supra note 31.
201. This Article also opens the path to discuss ways to decrease the strength of trade
secret law to achieve the same effect. Some scholarship has indeed begun criticizing the
broad doctrines of trade secret law in various contexts, though not in the context of the effect
of these broad doctrines on privacy law. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 36; Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 35.
202. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 31, at 1136–46.
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anyway, regardless of their existence in trade secret law. Yet, as
Joseph Fishman and Deepa Varadarajan have mentioned in a different context, “where a proposed rule seems justified on its theoretical merits, it’s still helpful to know that another regime has actually employed a similar rule in practice.”203
Below I consider doctrinal changes that would mirror the above
discussion about the doctrinal differences in trade secrecy and privacy law.204 Indeed, as discussed, privacy and trade secret laws are
different in the legal power granted to self-help protective
measures taken by the owner, in the standard that they apply to
establish secrecy, in the doctrines for third-party liability, in the
remedies that they award, and in the institutions that control enforcement.205 My key proposal below tackles the two first doctrinal
differences, by proposing to use the self-help precaution standard
as a sufficient condition to trigger a privacy right. I also propose to
enhance the liability for conscious third-party infringement of privacy and the remedial landscape of successful privacy lawsuits,
which I view as an easier doctrinal leap, and in the case of thirdparty liability, a mere regulatory oversight. Applying these
changes would also bring courts back to the front of the stage in
cases of privacy violations and would thus tackle the institutional
differences between the laws of privacy and of trade secrets and
the remedial space.
1. Establishing a “Secret” Under Privacy Law
Imagine that a new privacy statute provides that a right to privacy would mirror the trade secrecy requirements. The right would
then be established for valuable secret information if a person
could show that they took reasonable measures to protect the secrecy of the information.206 The first challenge an individual would
have in such a scenario would be to establish that the information
that they wish to keep private has value. In the business context
of trade secrecy, the requirement is to show that the information
203. Fishman & Varadarajan, supra note 35, at 1079. Previous scholarship has identified three doctrines in trade secret law that may be relevant for privacy protection: “the
relative secrecy doctrine, a balanced focus on relationships, and a broader view of actionable
wrongdoing and actionable harm.” See Sandeen, supra note 31, at 692; see also Samuelson,
supra note 31, at 1152–58.
204. See supra section I.B.
205. See supra section I.B.
206. See supra section I.A.
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has “economic value,” the definition of which makes complete sense
in the trade secrets context.207 Indeed, trade secrets operate in the
business world and their value is determined via economic
measures. Yet in the privacy context, a focus on economic value
would make little sense. Intuitively, a person should receive protection for information that has value other than that of the economic sort. But expanding the “value” requirement to any value
would essentially mean foregoing the requirement altogether.
Such an expanded value criteria would also raise justified concerns
over highly subjective harms and manipulative cases.208
How about the second trade secrets prerequisite—that protection would apply to information that is neither “generally known”
nor “readily ascertainable”? This requirement may subject privacy
protection to the same problems that it faces now under the “expectations of privacy” standard as interpreted by courts.209 Indeed,
it would be unrealistic for users to show that their information is
not “generally known” nor “easily ascertained” when virtually everyone’s personal information is already all over the Web and subject to rigorous data analytics.210
But the idea that users could show that they took precautions in
order to trigger protection of their information is in fact rather appealing. I do not propose that the trade secrecy standard of using
reasonable precautions would replace the “expectations of privacy”
standard. Rather, I propose that taking reasonable measures to
protect one’s information would satisfy the “expectations of privacy” standard.
Courts would decide ad hoc, on a case-by-case basis, whether the
safeguards that a person takes satisfy the “expectations of privacy”
standard. Courts already have experience in determining the reasonableness of information precautions from trade secret law.211
They are thus well suited to make such determinations in privacy
cases as well. Courts would also be able to develop jurisprudence
around the “reasonableness” of precautions, which would take into

207. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
208. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
209. See supra sections I.A., I.B.
210. See Helman, supra note 27, at 534 (“Data collection and data analytics technologies
also progress at an overwhelming speed, enabling social networks to learn more sensitive
information from less active information sharing by users . . . .”).
211. See supra Introduction, section I.A.
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account changes in technology and social norms,212 as well as normative considerations such as the desirability of the precautions
taken from a societal point of view. Courts’ decisions on the matter
could thus curtail the creation of precautions that interfere with
internet use or generate other negative externalities.213
Applying the “reasonable precautions” standard in the privacy
context would encourage internet users to share information in a
thoughtful, responsible, and cautious manner, and would compel
internet platforms and data collectors to mirror users’ choices. This
is a virtuous policy that would enhance the control of users over
the level of privacy that they require and allow them to decide ex
ante how each piece of data that they share should be treated. As
a result, the “reasonable precautions” standard would generate a
data economy that is based on responsible sharing and use of data.
This proposal would also be technology-endorsing and induce innovation, because it would incentivize the industry to offer productive
self-measures for users that the law would endorse.
I am mindful that this proposal would probably also have the
effect of under-protection of uncareful sharing of information. This
is particularly troubling in cases where users would not take precautions and would regret their sharing at a later time.214 Yet under this proposal, the position of such users would not be worse
than the current situation, where such users typically do not enjoy
protection either.215 Indeed, as described above, sharing of information today can easily be viewed as consent to almost any use of
the information, even by third parties. This proposal would allow
for attaching privacy protection to careful acts of information sharing. In any event, complementary rules may need to be created to

212. See supra note 90.
213. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
214. See Strahilevitz, supra note 82, at 679 (discussing cases where people may regret
earlier sharing); see, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing
the possibility of regretting an agreement for sharing); Jacqueline Howard, What’s the Average Age When Kids Get a Social Media Account?, CNN (June 22, 2018, 2:22 PM), https:
//edition.cnn.com/2018/06/22/health/social-media-for-kids-parent-curve/index.html [https://
perma.cc/BKK4-UQKT] (noting that people share information on social media when they
are younger and may come to regret it later in life); ‘Wild’ FSU Student Sues, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Jan. 23, 2002), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-2002-01-23-0201
230311-story.html [https://perma.cc/U95U-3A4L] (discussing a lawsuit filed by a college student who regretted her earlier exposure); see also CARL D. SCHNEIDER, SHAME EXPOSURE
AND PRIVACY 42 (1977).
215. See supra Introduction, section I.B.
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contend with such situations, perhaps in the spirit of the right to
be forgotten.
2. Third-Party Liability
I also propose that, like in trade secret law, third parties would
incur liability if they traded in information that they knew or
should have known was achieved via illegal measures and through
violations of privacy. Considering the way that privacy law has
evolved, it is safe to assume that the lack of any rule that forbids
data brokers from knowingly trafficking illegal content is not the
product of deliberate legal decision-making.216 Most likely, it is the
result of oversight or lack of any conscious decision by lawmakers.
I am mindful of the fact that requiring data brokers to verify the
source of information may sometimes be a burden.217 Some exceptions or safe harbors may need to be crafted after studying the matter more carefully. Yet overall, I believe that such a change would
not only enhance privacy protection, but would also help weed out
wrong or harmful information from databases and generate an incentive for the data-sharing industry to operate responsively.218
3. Remedies
In trade secrecy, injunctive relief is typically the most relevant
remedy because it directly addresses companies’ concerns of unfair
competition by the misappropriating party. But privacy violations
are more diverse. Not every infringement of privacy results in the
same kind or the same level of harm. In many cases, it would be
more effective to deter potential industry misappropriators via
monetary damages than by a ban on using one item out of their
vast databases.219
The landscape of remedies that courts de facto award in privacy
law obviously must be expanded. Yet I believe that a considerable
part of the solution would be available once courts adopt the “selfhelp” recognition that I proposed above. Indeed, once the hurdle of

216. See supra sections I.B, I.C.
217. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 129 (collecting sources arguing that the possibility of data laundering through data brokers encourages hacking in the first place).
219. See also Sandeen, supra note 31, at 705 (proposing to consider statutory damages).
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establishing a right under privacy law is overcome, the path to
matching remedies to that harm becomes much shorter.
CONCLUSION
Privacy law needs to be conceptualized within a framework that
would encourage lawmakers in general, and courts in particular,
to enforce it. Privacy law has gone a long time without such a
framework. But it cannot maintain this gap for much longer. Increasing commodification of users’ data and growing uses of private information cannot afford the lack of a national policy on information privacy.
Fortunately, there is a regime that can provide such a framework. Trade secrecy is an equivalent regime that has solid caselaw,
robust policy justifications, and relevant experience in how to identify and protect secrets under the law. While there are differences
between trade secrets and personal information, there are sufficient similarities between the goals of trade secrets and privacy
law to justify similar rules. At their core, both laws are designed to
promote beneficial sharing and to protect information that society
values.
My proposal paves the road to thinking of trade secrets standards that can apply to the privacy realm. Most of all, my proposal
can change the way the law conceptualizes privacy and can lay a
much-needed foundation for this analysis. But it would do so using
doctrinal tools that the law already has. Those tools can boost the
confidence of both companies and individuals with regards to the
use of private data in their businesses and in their lives.

